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'fSDICTION 
The L un Court oi r^ppcct^! * • - •..: 11 er pursuant to I Jtah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-?r?V_:;-
TS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
• 1. \\ litiiitT tfr Appdhiiil Donnie Sweazey ("Sweazey") waived his right to a 
jury trial. This issue was not raised * * \: .. *MICU lie raised the 
is>uv i(M ,nc first time in his 'Motion for Reconsideration/ : ! ;* Nuniuam of 
Reucu -, .. . iiiKiihii Hint n part> waived its right to a jury trial is reviewed 
under an abuse O-'HK •* -•• . * c Aspenwood, L.L.C. v. C.A.T., L.L.C, 73 P.3d 
947, 954 (Utah Ct. App, 2003). Likewis* a/. > s post-trial motion to 
reconsk-kt iii wlrrh he first uiised the issue of a jury trial, is also rn in1,, nl IIIHLT mi ,ilmse 
- tvi-^j. w.j •. .:,.
 t^<. in ttif Matter of the General Determination of Rights 99S2 
P.2d65, i [Vuw : l ' , J , ; i . 
. ,iiti LLC trial court erred < \ppcilee i i\ iiig J, in j . 
r11\ iiifi J") costs for the deposition of Sweazey, which deposition was Liken pi I«,»I lo 
Swea> ^' • •••, 1.1Kruptcy discharge. This issue was not raised by 
Sweazey until Mav !? . n^<K - h . * , w„. ... ,, ^ ion for 
Reconsideration." (R. 444-454,. j^ iudid of Review - ....... v>sts 
t. u) *-. reviewed under an abuse of discretion standaid. Si < «" / 
Consti - . . ,. _„ io42. 1051 (Utah 1984); Hardy v. Hardw "'•• 
P.2d 917, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) leaves the 
question of costs "somewhat in the discretion of the courts."). Likewise, the denial of 
Sweazey9s post-trial motion to reconsider in which he first raised his objection to the 
award of this particular cost, is also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
In the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999). 
3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Sweazey5 s attorney to withdraw 
eight months prior to the trial. This issue was not raised by Sweazey until May 12, 2005, 
when he raised the issue in his "Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444-454). Standard of 
Review: Flying J agrees with Sweazey that the standard of review with regard to this 
issue is abuse of discretion. (Appellant's Brief at p. 7). Likewise, the denial of 
Sweazey's post-trial motion to reconsider in which he first raised this issue, is also 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In the Matter of the General 
Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999). 
4. Whether the trial court judge demonstrated bias during the trial and prior 
proceedings and, if so, whether Sweazey waived any complaint relating to judicial bias by 
failing to file a timely motion to disqualify. This issue was not raised by Sweazey until 
May 12, 2005, when he raised the issue in his "Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444-
454). Standard of Review: Denial of Sweazey's post-trial motion to reconsider in which 
he first raised the issue of a bias is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In 
the Matter of the General Determination of Rights, 982 P.2d 65, 71 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMi , i a >ho 1111 I H >ROVISIOMS, 
Rule 54fd) of the Utah Rules ol Cu il ProceiL*i e 
(d)(2) //<in i«\M ss1*;. ilie party who claims his costs must w ithin five days after the 
entry ol*judgment serxe upon the adverse party against whom the costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action, and file w ith the court a like memorandum . . . . A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed, may u nhin seven days after service of th* *^ «vnorandum of costs, file a nv * 
to have ihe bill of costs taxed by the court. 
Ruic 3v ui me man Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) (jrounds. . . . « \ IK grained to any or all of the parties and on all or part 
of the issues, for am ' "HI v aiises: 
/
~
W1 x
 Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, ju.> wi au\ e 'v or any order of 
ourt, or abuse of discretion by which either partv was m n -r h;-j\ ing a fair 
; . ; Time for moiu - • w . i - - - ;all be served not later than 10 days after 
the entry of the judgment. 
Kuie 03( b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(b)( I)(A) \ paru b * urn n:l ion or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
JiM."mh>\ • *;-! * 
'h\ i)(B) I be motion shall be filed after • ...e action, but 
not later than 20 days after the last of the iun, *:•.. 
{o){i ){& )(\) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(M( i VRVi1, ippearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
i 
(b)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the 
motion is based, 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion 
shall be filed as soon as practicable. 
Rule 74 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) If a motion is not pending and a certificate of readiness for trial has not 
been filed, an attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court 
and serving on all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal 
shall include the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no 
motion is pending and no certificate of readiness for trial has been filed. If 
a motion is pending or a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed, an 
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The 
motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the 
date and purpose of any scheduled hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves Sweazey's personal injury claim arising out of an incident at a 
Flying J propane filling station in December 1997. Sweazey had taken four propane tanks 
to the store to be filled. During the filling process, propane began to leak out of the 
connection, as tends to happen from time to time during the normal filling process. 
Rather than let the Flying J attendant doing the filling remedy this situation (which was 
not creating any emergency situation), Sweazey voluntarily and inexplicably reached in 
with his hands and tightened the connection, exposing his hands to the propane for one 
second. He subsequently brought this action seeking damage for alleged injury to his 
hands. 
B. Course of Proceedings in the Trial Court 
Sweazey filed his complaint in this action on October 7,1999. (R. 3). On 
December 29, 2000, Sweazey's original counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel 
after which Sweazey represented himself pro se. See Withdrawal of Counsel (R. 34). 
During the course of discovery, Sweazey refused to respond to Flying J's discovery 
requests seeking information regarding his claims for economic damages (i.e. lost wages). 
The trial court issued an order compelling Sweazey to respond to discovery (R. 79), and 
later granted a motion to strike Sweazey's economic damage claims based on Sweazey's 
failure to respond to discovery regarding su.ch damages. (R. 130). 
On February 13,2004, after representing himself in this action pro se for over 
three years, Sweazey retained new counsel who entered their appearance in the action on 
February 13, 2004. See Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Plaintiff (R. 181). On July 
6, 2004, the trial court issued an Order for Scheduling Conference which, among other 
things, gave notice that the issue of a "jury or nonjury trial" would be discussed at a 
scheduling conference set for August 2,2004. See Order for Scheduling Conference (R. 
284). On August 2,2004, the trial court held the scheduling conference. Both Sweazey, 
his counsel, and counsel for Flying J appeared at the scheduling conference. During the 
scheduling conference, Sweazey9s counsel requested leave to withdraw as counsel and 
filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, or in the Alternative Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel at that time. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286); Withdrawal of Counsel or, 
in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Plaintiff (R. 289). Sweazey 
did not object to the withdrawal of his counsel and in fact, entered his personal 
appearance on the record and agreed on the record that the notice requirements of Rule 
74(b) had been satisfied. See Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for 
Plaintiff (R. 292). The trial court then proceeded to set a three day bench trial starting 
December 7, 2004. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286). Neither Sweazey nor his 
counsel, who was still at the scheduling conference, objected to the setting of a bench trial 
rather than a jury trial. 
On November 22, 2004, Sweazey requested that the trial setting be stricken due to 
a medical condition. The trial court granted the request. See Minutes Pretrial Conference 
(R. 295). On January 3, 2005, the trial court held another scheduling conference at which 
the court set a bench trial starting April 5, 2005. See Minutes Law and Motion (R. 301). 
Sweazey did not object to the bench trial setting at the April 5, 2005 scheduling 
conference. A one day bench trial was held on April 6, 2005. See Minutes Beach Trial 
(R. 428). 
C. Disposition in the Court Below 
Trial was held on April 6, 2005. The trial court found that Flying J was not 
negligent in any way with regard to the December 9, 1997 incident. The trial court 
further found that it was Sweazey who acted negligently and that even if an appellate 
court were to disagree with the trial court's conclusion that Flying J was not negligent, 
Flying J was in "no event more negligent than Sweazey." The trial court further found 
that Sweazey failed to present any evidence showing that he suffered medical injuries 
caused by his exposure to the propane. Order and Judgment, Conclusion of Law 6 (R. 
463-64). Based on these and numerous other findings in favor of Flying J, the trial court 
entered no cause of action against Sweazey, dismissed his claims with prejudice, and 
awarded Flying J $741.63 in costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). Order and Judgment (R. 464-
465). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
Sweazey has not appealed any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law of 
the trial court. The following background facts are set forth in order to set the issues on 
appeal into the context of the action. 
On December 9, 1997, Sweazey took four propane tanks to the Flying J store at 
2100 South and 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, to be filled with propane. The Flying J 
attendant, Nancy Beahm, attached the propane dispenser nozzle to one of Sweazey's 
tanks. During the filling process, propane sprayed out from the connection. The 
attendant did not ask Sweazey for assistance. Order and Judgment, Findings of Fact at fflf 
1-3, 12 (R. 459-60). 
It is usual and customary in the propane filling industry that some amount of 
propane unavoidably and routinely escapes into the atmosphere during the propane filling 
process. When propane leaks during the filling process, normal procedure is for the 
attendant to shut off the flow of propane and then tighten the connection. Id, at ^ 7, 9 
(R. 459) 
Sweazey, who was not wearing gloves, reached forward with his bare hands and 
tightened the connection. The actual amount of time that Sweazey9 s hands were in the 
leaking propane was approximately one second. Id. at fflf 5-6 (R. 459). Sweazey later 
complained of thermal injuries to his hands that he believed were caused by the contact 
with the escaping propane. Medical testing never revealed any objective evidence of 
injury to Sweazey's hands. According to Sweazey's treating physician, Dr. Stephen 
Morris, any injury to Sweazey's hands was minor and trivial. Id. at fflf 21-23 (R. 460-61) 
Liquid propane dissipates into the atmosphere immediately upon release, making it 
impossible for liquid propane to remain in liquid form on a person's hands. The 
temperature of propane upon its release into the atmosphere is negative 44 degrees 
Fahrenheit. Exposure to leaking propane at negative 44 degrees Fahrenheit for one 
second could not cause severe or permanent injury to Sweazey's hands. Exposure to 
leaking propane for a short period of time may cause, at most, minor frostbite. Id. at <|ffl 
28-31 (R. 461). 
The Flying J propane filling station was located in an open, well ventilated area. 
Propane does not present an explosion hazard in unconfined areas such as the Flying J 
propane filling station at issue in this case. There was no evidence that anyone was 
smoking in the area of the propane filling station. Even if there were such evidence, 
propane requires an open flame to ignite and cannot be ignited from a cigarette. There 
was no evidence of any ignition source that could have ignited leaking propane. Even if 
an ignition source were present, there was no risk of explosion from the leaking propane 
in the open area because propane dissipates immediately into the atmosphere and is not 
concentrated enough in an open area to ignite and explode. Id. at fflf 15-20 (R. 460). 
Facts Related to Specific Issues on Appeal 
The following Statement of Facts is organized relevant to each of the issues on 
appeal. 
Issue 1: Waiver of Jury Trial 
On July 6, 2004, the trial court gave notice that it would hold a scheduling 
conference on August 2, 2004. "Jury or nonjury trail" was listed as an item to be 
discussed. Order for Scheduling Conference (R. 284). Sweazey, his counsel, and counsel 
for Flying J appeared at the scheduling conference. August 2, 2005 Minutes Law and 
Motion (R. 286) (indicating those present). At the scheduling conference Sweazey's 
counsel moved for leave to withdraw as counsel. The reasons for the withdrawal 
included, but were not limited to, (1) Sweazey was failing to pay his attorneys and (2) 
Sweazey and his counsel had a "fundamental disagreement" "regarding the propriety of 
proceeding with this action through trial based upon the medical evidence currently 
available." Withdrawal of Counsel or, in the Alternative, Motion to Withdraw as Counsel 
for the Plaintiff at ffif 3(a), (c) (R. 290-291). The court granted Sweazey's counsel's 
motion to withdraw. August 2,2005 Minutes Law and Motion (R. 286). There is nothing 
in the Record indicating that Sweazey objected to his counsel's withdrawal. (R. 292). 
The trial court order setting the bench trial was issued while Sweazey's counsel was 
present in the court and was issued before the court entered the order allowing Sweazey's 
counsel to withdraw. See August 26, 2004 Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as 
Counsel for Plaintiff (R. 292). 
On January 3, 2005, the trial court held another scheduling conference attended by 
Sweazey. Minutes Law and Motion (R. 301). The trial court's January 3, 2005 
scheduling order states that "Bench trial is set for 3 days starting April 5, 2005." There is 
nothing in the Record indicating that Plaintiff objected to a bench trial. (R. 301). 
During a March 14, 2005 telephonic pretrial conference, the Court rescheduled the 
bench trial to begin April 6, 2005. Again, there is nothing in the Record indicating that 
Sweazey objected to a bench trial. (R. 315). 
The bench trial commenced on April 6,2005. Sweazey did not request a jury trial 
before or during the trial. The issue of a jury trial was not raised by Sweazey until May 
12, 2005, thirty six days after trial, when he raised the issue for the first time in his 
"Motion for Reconsideration." (R. 444-454). 
Issue 2: Award of Costs 
Sweazey was deposed by Flying J on May 2,2000. Court reporter fees for the 
deposition totaled $673.13. (R.437). In accordance with Rule 54(d), Flying J filed a 
Memorandum of Costs and Request for Award of Costs on April 13,2005. (R. 432). 
Flying J requested total costs of $741.63, which included the $673.13 in deposition costs. 
On May 12, 2005, nearly one month after Flying J filed its Request for Award of Cots, 
Sweazey filed an Objection to Proposed Judgment and Order Dismissing Action with 
Prejudice in which he objected to the $673.13 in deposition costs on the sole ground that 
he had received a bankruptcy discharge after the deposition but long before the trial. (R. 
455-57). On May 16, 2005, the court awarded Flying J $741.63 in costs in its Order and 
Judgment. (R. 466.) 
Issue 3: Withdrawal of Counsel 
Sweazey's original counsel voluntarily withdrew on December 29, 2000. (R. 34). 
Sweazey represented himself pro se for over three years until his new counsel, Morrison 
& Morrison, appeared in this case in February 2004. (R. 181) Six months later, Morrison 
& Morrison filed a motion to withdraw on the basis that (among other things) "a conflict 
and/or fundamental disagreement has arisen between counsel and the plaintiff regarding 
the continued propriety of proceeding with this action through trial, based upon the 
medical evidence currently available" and Sweazey was failing to pay his legal fees. 
(R.291). The court granted Sweazey9s counsel's motion to withdraw from the bench at 
the August 2, 2004 hearing (R. 286) and entered an order to that effect on August 26, 
2004. (R. 292). There is nothing in the record indicating that Sweazey objected to Mr. 
Morrison's withdrawal. (R. 292). 
Issue 4: Judicial Bias 
During the April 6, 2005 bench trial, the court questioned Flying J's counsel about 
the applicability of a $3,000 threshold regarding medical bills. Flying J's counsel 
responded that it was aware of the $3,000 threshold under the Utah no-fault insurance law 
(Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309), but that such threshold only applied in automobile 
accident cases and had no applicability in this case.1 The court nonetheless included in its 
ruling from the bench that, as a separate basis for its decision, Sweazey did meet the 
threshold. The court vacated this ruling during a telephonic conference call on April 8, 
2005. (R. 430). Nothing concerning such a threshold was included in the court's Order 
and Judgment. (R.458-465). 
Sweazey has cited to no facts in the record that indicate judicial bias, and Flying J 
believes there are no such facts. Neither Sweazey nor his counsel ever filed any motion 
to disqualify the trial court judge. 
1
 Sweazey failed to obtain a transcript of the trial as required under Rule 11 even though 
Flying J filed a designation of that portion of the transcript to be included in the record on 
appeal. Nevertheless, Flying J's recitation of the trial court's query regarding the $3,000 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issues on appeal are improperly before the Court because they were not raised 
before the trial court. Further, Sweazey's issues on appeal are without merit and should 
be denied and the trial court's judgment and order affirmed. Sweazey waived his right to 
a jury trial. Sweazey failed to object to Flying J's request for costs in the time allowed 
under Rule 54(d), and in any event, the 2005 award of fees was not discharged by 
Sweazey's 2000 bankruptcy. The trial court properly allowed Sweazey's counsel to 
withdraw for non-payment of fees and disagreement over whether Sweazey's case had 
sufficient merit to proceed to trial. Sweazey has cited no evidence of bias by the trial 
court and waived any complaint of bias by failing to file a timely motion to disqualify. 
Finally, even if there were any error, such error was harmless. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SWEAZEY FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ISSUES ON APPEAL BY NOT RAISING 
THE ISSUES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Sweazey has not challenged any of the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the 
trial court. Rather, his complaints are procedural in nature. Sweazey has cited to nothing 
in the record to show that any of these procedural issues were brought to the attention of 
threshold is accurate and consistent with the court's minute entry (R. 430) in which the 
court discusses the issue. 
1 *5 
the trial court in a timely manner and are therefore improperly before this court on appeal. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently affirmed, 
As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal. A party cannot circumvent that rule by merely mentioning an 
issue without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority; 
such a mere mention does not preserve that issue for appeal. The 
preservation requirement is based on the premise that, in the interest of 
orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to 
address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it. Accordingly, an 
objection must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial court can consider it. 
State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 553 (Utah 2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
The first time Sweazey made mention of any of the issues on appeal was on May 
12, 2005, thirty six days after the conclusion of the trial, when he mentioned the issues in 
his Motion for Reconsideration. However, as this Court has explained, "[a] motion to 
reconsider is not expressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Although 
Rule 54(b) allows a court, in its discretion, to change its mind in cases where the court 
has entered judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all of the claims of the parties, this 
rule would have no application in this case where all claims were decided on April 6, 
2005. 
Further, the proper procedural mechanism for Sweazey to raise his issues of (1) 
wanting a new trial before a jury; (2) claiming unfairness because his counsel withdrew 
eight months before trial; and (3) his unsubstantiated claim of judicial bias, would have 
14 
been a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (grounds for new trial 
include "irregularity in the proceedings" and being prevented from having a "fair trial"). 
Sweazey never made such a motion. 
Notwithstanding that these issues are improperly before the Court, none of 
Sweazey's complaints are supported by applicable law. Furthermore, Sweazey fails to 
make a single citation to the record in support of his arguments. 
POINT II 
SWEAZEY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
Waiver of the right to jury trial was addressed by this Court in Aspenwood, L.L. C. 
v. C.A.T., L.L.C., 73 P.3d 947 (Utah Ct. App. 2003), cert denied 72 P.3d 685 (2003). 
According to this Court, "[generally, a party who does not object to a bench trial setting 
waives the right to a trial by jury." Id, at 955. As Sweazey states in his brief, the case 
was changed from a jury trial to a bench trial on August 2, 2004, at a hearing where 
Sweazey was represented by counsel. Sweazey Brief at 7. There is nothing in the record 
to indicate that Sweazey or his counsel ever objected to a bench trial. Even during the 
trial, at which no jury was present, Sweazey never so much as suggested he wanted a jury 
trial. 
Like Sweazey, the plaintiff in Aspenwood had requested a jury trial in its original 
complaint, but failed to object to the court scheduling a bench trial. This Court held that 
"the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that [the plaintiff] waived its 
right to a jury trial because, after having notice that the trial was set before the bench, [the 
plaintiff] failed to object until the eve of trial." Id. at 956. 
Whereas the plaintiff in Aspenwood finally objected to a bench rather than a jury 
trial on the eve of trial, Sweazey never objected to a bench trial until more than a month 
after the trial occurred. Thus, it is clear that Sweazey waived his right to a jury trial under 
applicable precedent. To rule otherwise would allow a party like Sweazey to request a 
jury trial, remain silent when a bench trial is set, evaluate the outcome of the trial, and 
then if the outcome is undesirable, claim that a jury trial should have been held. The 
courts should not allow litigants a "second bite at the apple" by consenting to a bench trial 
through silence. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY AWARDED COSTS PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) provides that "costs shall be allowed as of course to the 
prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d). The trial court 
awarded Flying J $741.63 for costs pursuant to Rule 54(d), including $673.13 for the cost 
of deposing Sweazey. (R.465). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that deposition costs are taxable "costs" for 
purposes of Rule 54(d) when "the trial court is persuaded that they were taken in good 
faith and, in the light of the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development 
and presentation of the case." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042, 
1051 (Utah 1984). Flying J set out its explanation regarding each of these factors in its 
Memorandum of Costs and Request for Award of Costs Pursuant to Rule 54(D). (R. 
433). 
Sweazey argues that costs cannot be taxed against him because he obtained a 
discharge of debts in 2003. The Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge under 
Chapter 7 applies to "all debts that arose before the date of the order.59 11 U.S.C. § 
727(b). However, the liability for the costs that were taxed against Sweazey did not arise 
until April 6, 2005, when Flying J prevailed in this action against him and an award of 
costs became available to Flying J as the prevailing party under Rule 54(b). At least one 
federal Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "We have also endorsed the notion that by 
voluntarily continuing to pursue litigation post-petition that had been initiated pre-
petition, a debtor may be held personally liable for attorney fees and costs that result from 
that litigation." Boeing N. Am., Inc. v. Ybarra (In re Ybarra), 424 F.3d 1018, 1024 (9th 
Cir. 2005) 
Additionally, Flying J filed its Memorandum of Costs on April 13, 2005. (R. 436). 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), Sweazey was required to file any objection to the 
memorandum within 7 days. He failed to do so and therefore any objection to the costs 
was waived. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED SWEAZEY'S COUNSEL TO WITHDRAW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 74 grants trial courts the authority to allow an attorney to withdraw 
even if a motion is pending or a case is ready for trial. Morrison & Morrison's motion to 
withdraw as Sweazey's counsel set forth ample reason to justify the Court's exercise of 
its discretion. As Sweazey's counsel stated in their motion to withdraw, Sweazey was not 
paying costs and fees as he had agreed. More importantly, Sweazey and his counsel 
disagreed over the current state of the medical evidence in this case and whether the case 
had enough merit to proceed to trial. As it turned out, Sweazey's counsel was correct— 
there was not sufficient evidence to proceed to trial in this meritless and frivolous action. 
Sweazey's counsel was prohibited under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
from advancing a case that was not supported by fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) 
(providing that by advocating a position in court, an attorney certifies that the position has 
evidentiary support). Here, Sweazey's own treating physician testified that any injury to 
Sweazey was "minor and trivial." Counsel could not ethically be expected to take such a 
case to trial. Under these circumstances, Morrison & Morrison was justified in moving 
to withdraw as counsel in this case and the trial court was more than justified in granting 
the motion. 
Further, Sweazey has failed to cite any evidence that he objected to Morrison & 
Morrison's withdrawal at the time. Consequently, any objection Sweazey may have had 
was waived. It is also worth noting that trial did not commence until approximately eight 
months after Morrison & Morrison was allowed to withdraw, a fact that tends to discount 
any alleged prejudice Sweazey may have suffered from the withdrawal of his counsel. It 
should also be remembered that Sweazey represented himself in this case for over three 
years before Morrison & Morrison entered their appearance. 
Perhaps most importantly, Sweazey has failed to provide any support for his 
contention that allowing Morrison & Morrison to withdraw eight months before trial 
constituted reversible error. Sweazey has instead argued that the withdrawal may have 
constituted a breach of Rule 1.16(b)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Sweazey 
Brief at p. 8). While this (if true) may give rise to a bar complaint or malpractice claim 
against his counsel, it does not constitute reversible error. Sweazey had no right to 
counsel in this civil case. See generally, Cruz, 122 P.3d at 555 ("defendant may claim 
ineffective assistance of counsel only if he had a right to counsel in the first place .... and 
Cruz had no right to counsel in the civil forfeiture action.") 
On top of these other flaws, Sweazey misconstrues the standard in Rule 1.16(b)(1) 
as prohibiting withdrawal if it will "materially adversely affect the interests of the client." 
Sweazey Brief at p.8. Instead, Rule 1.16(b) states that withdrawal is allowable if no such 
impact will occur or if there is a fundamental disagreement between counsel and client or 
if the client fails to fulfill its obligation to pay fees incurred or if the representation will 
impose an unreasonable burden on counsel or if other good cause exists. Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(l-7). Morrison & Morrison alleged each of these 
circumstances in its motion. (R. 289-291). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACT WITH BIAS 
According to Sweazey, "at the commencement of the trail [sic] proceeding Judge 
Iwasaki instructed counsel to determine if the case could be dismissed based on the a [sic] 
$3000 dollar threshold .... the fact that the judge was instructing the opposing counsel in 
how to dismiss the case shows bias and predisposition against the Appellant which may 
have influenced prior decisions during the proceedings." Sweazey Brief at 8. 
In fact, at the end of Sweazey's presentation of his case, the Court did question 
Flying J's counsel about the applicability of such a threshold and whether it was a basis 
for dismissal. In response, Flying J counsel asserted that, while they were aware of a 
$3,000 threshold under Utah's no-fault personal injury protection law, such a threshold 
only applied to automobile accident cases and had no applicability in this action. The 
Court later acknowledged that Flying J's counsel was accurate on this point. (R. 430). 
Nothing concerning such a threshold was included in the court's Order and Judgment. 
(R.458-465). 
One of the proper roles of the trial court is to determine if a particular rule of law 
applies to the facts at hand. In meeting this role, it is entirely proper for the trial court to 
question parties' counsel on applicable law. There is absolutely nothing in the facts 
alleged by Sweazey that indicate any degree of bias. To the contrary, a review of the 
record in this case, spanning six years, reveals that the trial court was extraordinarily 
patient with Sweazey, allowing him to continue to trial despite Sweazey's repeated delay 
and failure to cooperate in this case. Sweazey failed to cooperate in discovery. See Order 
(R. 79). Sweazey refused and failed to pay court ordered sanctions for failure to appear at 
a scheduling conference). See January 8, 2002 Minutes Law & Motion (R. 11 l)(Ordering 
Sweazey to pay $250 in attorney's fees for failing to appear at the scheduling 
conference); Flying J Motion Dismiss (R. 146) (arguing for dismissal of case based on 
Sweazey's failure to pay the $250. The court denied the motion (R. 175)). Sweazey was 
ordered on two occasions to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. See Notices of Order to Show Cause (R. 36, R. 136). Sweazey requested 
and was granted a continuance of the trial date. (R. 295). The trial court gave Sweazey 
every opportunity to have his case heard in court and was more than fair in its treatment 
of Sweazey. 
As to Sweazey's allegations that Mr. Morrison and Judge Iwasaki were "college 
buddies" and that this influenced Judge Iwasaki's decision to grant the motion to 
withdraw, Flying J has no knowledge of anything in the record to support this statement. 
Pursuant to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to disqualify a judge 
must be made no later than 20 days after (i) assignment of the case to the judge; (ii) 
appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or (iii) the date on which the moving party 
learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds 
upon which the motion was based. Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b). Here, Sweazey never raised 
this issue until over a month after the conclusion of trial. As argued above, Sweazey's 
complaint on this point is untimely (as well as without merit) and should be denied. See 
Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted) (Utah rules "require[] that a party alleging judicial bias or prejudice must first 
file an affidavit to that effect in the trial court. We will not, therefore, consider the issue 
of judicial bias or prejudice when it is raised, as in the present case, for the first time on 
appeal."). 
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POINT VI 
ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS 
Based on the actual events at trial and the unchallenged findings of fact which 
were overwhelming in favor of Flying J, even if Sweazey's first, third, and fourth issues 
on appeal had merit (which they do not) there is no reason to believe that any of these 
issues could possibly amount to anything more than harmless error. See, e.g., Armed 
Forces Insur. Exchange v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35,41 (Utah 2003) ("'If the error was 
harmless, that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that if affected the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order.'") 
{quoting Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1255 (Utah 1997)). 
Even putting aside for the moment the overwhelming evidence and unchallenged 
findings of fact that any negligence regarding the incident was totally attributable to 
Sweazey for voluntarily sticking his hands into the leaking propane, he was unable to 
show any injury. His own doctor—the treating physician for his alleged injuries-
testified that "any injury to Sweazey's hands was minor and trivial." Finding of Fact No. 
23 (R. 461). A necessary element of his claim for personal injury was actual injury which 
he could not establish. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's order and 
judgment in favor of Flying J. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ day of January 2006. 
MABEY MURRAY, LC 
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